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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kami Marie Pablo appeals from the district court's order revoking her 
probation and executing, without reduction, the sentence imposed upon her 
guilty plea to aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On March 15, 2007, Pablo delivered approximately three grams of 
methamphetamine to a confidential informant. (PSI, pp.3, 13-18.) The state 
charged her with delivering methamphetamine. (R., p.73.) The case went to 
trial, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict and, as a result, a mistrial was 
declared. (R., pp.108-14.) 
Following the mistrial, the state filed an amended Information charging 
Pablo with aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine. (R., p.158.) 
Pablo pied guilty, and the district court withheld judgment and placed her on 
probation for five years, commencing in September 2009. (R., pp.157, 189-95.) 
As a condition of probation, Pablo was required to participate in the Nez Perce 
County Mental Health Court Program. (R., p.193.) 
On June 22, 2011, Pablo's probation officer submitted a report of violation 
alleging that Pablo began violating her probation as early as January 2010 by 
repeatedly using drugs and alcohol, failing to appear for three urine analysis 
tests, and leaving the Lakeside shelter care facility - where she was required to 
live as a condition of her participation in mental health court - without permission 
on multiple occasions. (R., pp.202-05.) Pablo admitted five of the 21 allegations 
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in the report of violation, and the district court revoked the withheld judgment and 
probation, imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.211-20.) At the conclusion of the retained 
jurisdiction period, the district court suspended the balance of Pablo's sentence 
and reinstated her on probation for five years. (R., pp.228-33.) The court 
entered its order reinstating Pablo on probation on January 3, 2012. (R., p.229.) 
On March 29, 2012, Pablo's probation officer submitted a second report of 
violation alleging that, "[a]lmost immediately after being place[d] back on 
probation Ms. Pablo began to violate her probation." (R., pp.239-41.) 
Specifically, the report alleged that between January 6, 2012, and March 28, 
2012, Pablo violated her probation by failing on multiple occasions to abide by 
her curfew, failing to attend a scheduled appointment with her probation officer, 
consuming alcohol on numerous occasions, failing to attend substance abuse 
treatment, and using methamphetamine and marijuana. (R., pp.239-41.) After 
an evidentiary hearing, the district court found Pablo had violated her probation 
as alleged. (R., pp.252-56; Tr., p.79, Ls.6-9.) The court revoked Pablo's 
probation and ordered her underlying sentence executed. (R., pp.255-57.) 
Pablo filed a notice of appeal timely from the court's order revoking her 
prob'3tion. (R., pp.262-65.) She also filed an untimely Rule 35 motion for 




Pablo states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. 
Pablo's probation and executed her underlying sentence of five 
years, with one year fixed? 
2. Was Ms. Pablo denied due process when the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied her request to augment the record on 
appeal with a necessary transcript? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Pablo failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
either by revoking her probation or by not sua sponte reducing her sentence 
upon doing so? 
2. Has Pablo failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated her 
constitutional right to due process by denying her motion to augment the 




Pablo Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Pablo argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her 
probation and ordering her sentence executed without reduction. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.6-12.) The record supports the court's sentencing decisions; Pablo has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). The 
decision whether to reduce an underlying sentence upon the revocation of 
probation is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hanington, 148 
Idaho 26, 28, 218 P .3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). 
C. Pablo Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Revoking Her Probation And Ordering Her Sentence Executed Without 
Reduction 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P .2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining 
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whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is 
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of 
society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); 
Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. Any cause satisfactory to the court, 
which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify 
revocation. State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original 
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 
783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's decision not to reduce a sentence 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards 
governing whether a sentence is excessive. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 
P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any 
reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the 
objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 
P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine 
the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment," 
i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 
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between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington, 
148 Idaho at 29, 218 P.3d at 8. 
In deciding to revoke Pablo's probation and order her sentence executed 
without reduction, the district court reasoned: 
This is - these are tough cases. And I appreciate the fact that you 
have some mental health issues that you struggle with and have a 
hard time. And you've - those are always kind of affecting your 
ability to be successful on probation. 
You've really been through a number of the kinds of 
programming we have available for someone who struggles with 
mental health issues and issues with controlled substances. And, 
really, probably the best and most effective program we might have 
is our mental health court program where we have people meet 
together, as you know. You participated in that. And That's 
probably as intensive a program as we provide, certainly, in an 
effort to keep folks functional in the community rather than be 
incarcerated. 
And I know you were in that program for a period of time. 
You were ultimately turned out of the program for noncompliance. 
Then we tried the rider program. That was relatively recently. You 
came back. You had a reasonably favorable report. So, based on 
that, I placed you on probation again, hopeful that you could be 
compliant and be successful in a non-custodial setting. 
And relatively shortly thereafter, we have, of course, just a 
long list of probation violations that indicate you're - you're really 
not able to comply with the terms and conditions of probation, and 
you violate your probation. You do it on a frequent basis. 
And as [the probation officer] indicated, it's really hard to 
supervise someone that doesn't - isn't always in the same place or 
where they're indicating they're going to be. And so, it's really -
you've made it very difficult to - for Probation to even keep track of 
your whereabouts to ensure that you can be successful on 
probation. 
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So, Ms. Pablo, where - where we've come is, we've tried 
everything we can - or that we have available in a non-custodial 
setting. And then we tried our rider program, which is a custodial 
setting with the idea of programming and, hopefully, positioning you 
to where you can be successful on probation. You went through 
that, got that positive recommendation. But unfortunately, you've 
been unsuccessful on probation. 
(Tr., p.84, L.12 - p.85, L.25.) 
As illustrated by the district court's comments, Pablo's probation was 
clearly not achieving the goal of rehabilitation nor was it consistent with the 
protection of society. The district court gave Pablo multiple opportunities to 
succeed on community supervision, both by retaining jurisdiction and by twice 
placing her on probation. With each opportunity, Pablo attributed her conduct to 
her mental health issues and claimed that she wanted to and/or would do better. 
(Tr., p.10, Ls.21-24, p.19, Ls.19-25, p.31, Ls.11-21, p.70, L.16 - p.78, L.4.) 
Pablo did succeed in the retained jurisdiction program (See generally APSI), but 
with each opportunity for probation she promptly violated the conditions of her 
release by, among other things, resuming her drug and/or alcohol use, failing to 
comply with the requirements of mental health court, failing to report for 
supervision and failing to abide by her curfew (R., pp.202-05, 211-12, 239-41, 
252-56; Tr., p.4, L.18 - p.79, L.10). Clearly, Pablo's probation was not achieving 
its rehabilitative purpose. The district court thus acted well within its discretion in 
revoking that probation. Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99. 
On appeal, Pablo acknowledges that her probation "violations were 
serious," but contends the court should have continued her on probation in light 
of her mental health and substance abuse issues. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) That 
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Pablo believes, perhaps even sincerely, that she can succeed on probation now 
that she claims to have made a number of realizations about the steps she must 
take to remain drug and alcohol free and address her mental health issues does 
not demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to revoke 
her probation. Pablo participated in mental health court and was ordered to 
attend substance abuse treatment during her probationary periods. (See R., 
pp.203-05, 239-41; Tr., p.54, Ls.12-23, p.60, L.17 - p.62, L.22.) She also 
completed a number of programs, including Moral Reconation Therapy and 
Relapse Prevention, during her rider. (See generally APSI.) Despite these 
opportunities for treatment and programming designed specifically to address 
her mental health and substance abuse issues, and despite her best intentions, 
Pablo has demonstrated an inability either to follow through with mental health 
treatment or to abstain from using alcohol and illegal substances while on 
community supervision. In fact, it appears that the only time Pablo succeeded in 
managing her mental health and substance abuse issues was during her period 
of retained jurisdiction, thus demonstrating that incarceration in a structured, 
custodial setting is precisely what is appropriate to address Pablo's mental 
health and substance abuse issues. Such is also consistent with the 
assessment of Pablo's probation officer that Pablo's inability to manage her 
mental health issues, despite being given tools and opportunities to do so, 
rendered her unsuitable for probation. (See Tr., p.63, Ls.1-17, p.68, Ls.9-15.) 
Pablo argues that, even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
revoking her probation, it should nevertheless have sua sponte reduced her 
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underlying sentence in light of her mental health and substance abuse issues, 
the support she receives from her family, and her status as a first-time felon. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-12.) None of the "mitigating" factors Pablo cites 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. While it is undoubtedly true, as Pablo 
contends, that she has a documented mental health issue that interferes with her 
ability to comply with the conditions of probation, that the underlying aiding and 
abetting delivery of methamphetamine charge is her first felony conviction, and 
that she enjoys the support of her family, these considerations in no way 
diminish the district court's conclusion that Pablo's rehabilitation could best be 
achieved by execution of the one-to-five year prison sentence. Indeed, even 
Pablo herself testified that her mental health condition was the result of her 
substance abuse, and that it would take five to eight years of sobriety before the 
"voices" in her head that kept her from conforming her behavior to the rules of 
probation and society would dissipate. (Tr., p.71, Ls.2-12, p.72, Ls.5-7.) That 
the district court did not place greater mitigating weight on the factors Pablo now 
cites as mitigating, or elevate them above the need, once and for all, to address 
Pablo's substance abuse and mental health issues while at the same time 
protecting society, does not establish an abuse of discretion. 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined Pablo was no longer a viable candidate for community supervision. 
Pablo's history and character, together with her demonstrated inability or 
unwillingness to comply with treatment opportunities, the law and the terms of 
her probation did not entitle her to reinstatement on probation or to a sua sponte 
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reduction of her underlying sentence. Pablo has failed to establish that the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
II. 
Pablo Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Her 
Constitutional Rights By Denying Her Motions To Augment The Appellate 
Record With An Irrelevant Transcript 
A. Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Pablo filed a motion to augment the 
record with a transcript of her April 16, 2009 guilty plea hearing. (Motion To 
Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support 
Thereof, filed October 12, 2012 ("Motion").) The state objected, and the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied Pablo's request. (Objection To "Motion To Augment And 
To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof," filed 
October 17, 2012; Order Denying Motion To Augment And To Suspend The 
Briefing Schedule, entered October 29, 2012.) 
Almost two months later, Pablo filed a Motion To Reconsider The Order 
Denying Appellant's Motion To Augment And Suspend The Briefing Schedule 
("Renewed Motion"), again seeking to augment the appellate record with a 
transcript of the guilty plea hearing, which Pablo attached to her Renewed 
Motion. (Renewed Motion, filed December 18, 2012.) The Idaho Supreme 
Court denied the motion and ordered Pablo to file her Appellant's brief 
"FORTHWITH." (Order Denying Motion To Reconsider The Order Denying 
Appellant's Motion To Augment And Suspend The Briefing Schedule, entered 
December 28, 2012.) 
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Pablo now contends that, by denying her motion to augment the appellate 
record with the requested transcript, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated her 
constitutional right to due process. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-15.) Pablo has 
failed to establish a violation of her constitutional rights because she has failed to 
show that the requested transcript is even relevant to, much less necessary for 
resolution of, the only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Should This Case Be Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals, Pablo 
Has Failed To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho 
Supreme Court's Orders Denying Her Motions To Augment 
In State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 837-39 (Ct. App. 
2012) (review denied Nov. 29, 2012), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a 
claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied the appellant his constitutional rights 
by denying his motion to augment the record on appeal with various transcripts. 
In doing so the Court "disclaim[ed] any authority to review, and, in effect, reverse 
an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior to assignment 
of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme 
Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other law." ~ 
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at_, 288 P.3d at 837. Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would be 
tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho 
Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court." IsL 
The Court, however, "deem[ed] it within [its] authority ... to evaluate and rule on 
[a] renewed motion" if, for example, "the completed appellant's brief and/or 
respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or expanded issues on appeal in such 
a way as to demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts, or where 
new evidence is presented to support a renewed motion." IsL 
To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Pablo's 
arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho 
Supreme Court's orders denying her motions to augment the record with an 
additional transcript that is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has already ruled on Pablo's Renewed Motion and Pablo 
has not "refined, clarified or expanded [the] issues on appeal in such a way as to 
demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts," nor has she 
presented new evidence to support renewing her motion to augment yet again. 
Instead, assuming the case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Pablo is merely 
asking the Court to re-evaluate the relevancy arguments that were already 
presented to and rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Compare Appellant's 
brief, pp.13-14, with Motion and Renewed Motion.) As stated in Morgan, the 
Court of Appeals has no authority to do so. 
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D. If This Court Considers The Merits Of Pablo's Constitutional Claim, She 
Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of Her Due Process Rights 
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Pablo's constitutional 
claim, her arguments fail. A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right 
to "a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the 
errors alleged regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 
457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 
(1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. 
Of Prison Terms And Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 
(1956)); see also Morgan, 153 Idaho at _, 288 P.3d at 838. The state, 
however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide 
transcripts that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 372 
U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (indigent 
appellant has right to "a transcript of relevant trial proceedings"). Rather, an 
indigent defendant is entitled, at state expense, to only those transcripts and 
portions of the record necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Griffin, 
351 U.S. 12; Lane, 372 U.S. 477. "[T]he State must afford [the indigent 
appellant] a record complete enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his 
claims." S.L.J., 519 U.S. at 121. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, 
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his 
ability to pursue the appeal. See State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 
P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 
P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
13 
Pablo's appeal is timely only from the district court's May 14, 2012 Order 
Revoking Probation And Reimposing Sentence and, as such, that is the only 
order over which this Court has appellate jurisdiction. (Compare I.AR. 14(a) 
(notice of appeal must be filed within 42 days of order challenged on appeal) 
with R., pp.255 and 262 (notice of appeal filed 21 days after entry of order 
revoking probation).) The transcript of the proceedings related to that revocation 
decision, as well as the written materials relied on by the district court in deciding 
to revoke Pablo's probation, are all included in the record on appeal. (See 
generally Tr., pp.44-86 (combined evidentiary and disposition hearing held May 
10, 2012); R., pp.203-12, 239-41, 252-53; Exhibits (including 6/11/09 PSI; 
11/30/11 APSI; State's Exhibits 1-6 (admitted at 5/10/12 evidentiary hearing)).) 
A transcript of the April 16, 2009 guilty plea hearing is unnecessary because this 
Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the withheld judgment that issued 
from that hearing. More importantly, the transcript of that hearing was not 
presented to the district court in relation to the probation violation proceedings at 
issue in this case, and there is no indication that what was said at the guilty plea 
hearing played any role in the order challenged on appeal. The transcript is 
simply unnecessary for appellate review of the only order within the scope of this 
Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
Pablo argues otherwise, contending the requested transcript is necessary 
to ascertain precisely what she said at the April 2009 change of plea hearing 
regarding her mental health and substance abuse issues. (Appellant's brief, 
p.14.) Pablo's argument is necessarily that some statement she made at the 
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guilty plea hearing was so influential at the probation revocation proceedings 
held three years later in May 2012 that a transcript of the earlier proceeding is 
necessary to review for an abuse of the district court's discretion. Pablo's 
argument is without merit as it ignores the scope of this Court's appellate review. 
In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified that although it "will not 
arbitrarily confine [itself] to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation ... that does not mean that a// proceedings in 
the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane." 153 Idaho at _, 
288 P.3d at 838 (emphasis original). Rather, "[t]he focus of the inquiry is the 
conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation." kl 
Accordingly, the Court "will consider the elements of the record before the trial 
court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part 
of the record on appeal." kl 
As set forth in more detail above, the current record includes all of the 
information that was actually before the district court in deciding whether to 
revoke Pablo's probation and is more than adequate for appellate review of 
Pablo's claims that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation 
and ordering her sentence executed without reduction. Because all relevant 
information is already included in the record on appeal, Pablo has failed to show 
any due process violation resulting from the Idaho Supreme Court's orders 
denying her requests for augmentation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking Pablo's probation and executing her underlying sentence. 
DATED this 1st day of March 2013. 
Deputy Attorney Gener 
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